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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Brian K. Barner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order denying his 
motion for reconsideration of two prior orders granting summary judgment for the 
defendants in his civil rights action.  He also seeks to bring up for review on appeal the 
underlying summary judgment orders.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order. 
3 
 
I.  Background and Procedural History 
 
 On September 30, 2005, Barner filed a civil rights and Federal Tort Claims Act 
complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
against various officials of the Allenwood Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI-
Allenwood”), where Barner was imprisoned from May 18, 2000 to September 20, 2005.  
Barner alleged various due process violations stemming from these officials’ 
determinations that he committed various acts that violated prison policies.  Barner also 
alleged that some of these officials physically and verbally threatened him to try to get 
him to withdraw administrative grievances that he filed.   
 In orders dated March 27, 2007 and March 28, 2007, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for all of the defendants.  The record does not indicate when Barner 
received notice of the entry of the orders.  On April 13, 2007, Barner delivered to prison 
officials for filing a motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e).1
                                              
1 Under the prison mailbox rule, Barner’s motions were deemed filed on the date that he 
delivered them to prison officials for forwarding to the District Court.  See Houston v. 
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).  
  The District Court docketed this filing on April 23, 2007.  Under the rules in 
effect at the time of Barner’s filing, he had ten days to file a motion for reconsideration.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2007).  This would mean that, excluding weekends and legal 
holidays, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), Barner had until April 10, 2007 as to the March 27, 
2007 order, and until April 11, 2007 as to the March 28, 2007 order to file his motion for 
reconsideration.  Barner did not give his motion for reconsideration (as to both orders) to 
prison authorities for filing until April 13, 2007.  The defendants opposed Barner’s 
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motion for reconsideration on the merits, and did not raise the fact that his motion was 
untimely. 
 While that motion was pending before the District Court, on May 24, 2007, Barner 
filed a timely notice of appeal of the District Court’s March 27, 2007 and March 28, 2007 
orders.  On June 18, 2007, Barner filed a motion to hold his appeal in abeyance while his 
motion for reconsideration was pending in the District Court.  We denied his request, and 
dismissed his appeals on October 3, 2007 for failure to pay the filing fees.   
 On November 13, 2007, the District Court denied Barner’s motion for 
reconsideration on the merits.  It did not address the timeliness of Barner’s motion.  
Barner filed a notice of appeal on December 27, 2007, seeking to appeal the November 
13, 2007 order denying his motion for reconsideration, as well as the March 27, 2007 and 
March 28, 2007 orders granting summary judgment for the defendants.   
 Barner raises two issues on appeal.  The first is whether we erred in dismissing his 
first notice of appeal. The second question is whether Barner’s untimely motion for 
reconsideration tolled the time to file a notice of appeal of the underlying judgment, 
considering that the defendants never raised the fact that his motion for reconsideration 
was untimely and that the District Court denied the motion on the merits.   
II.  Discussion 
 
 A. Our Jurisdiction to Review the Underlying Summary Judgment Orders 
 
1. The First Notice of Appeal  
 
 Barner contends that we erred in dismissing his first notice of appeal for failure to 
pay the filing fees because we had no power to act on that appeal while his motion for 
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reconsideration was pending in the District Court.  As a result, he asks that we reinstate 
his first appeal.  If we did so, that appeal would be timely as measured from the District 
Court’s summary judgment orders, and would bring up the underlying summary 
judgment orders for review. 
The payment of filing fees is a precondition to docketing or opening a case.  
Porter v. Dep’t of Treasury, 564 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2009).  When a litigant fails to 
pay those fees, the clerk of the court “is authorized to dismiss the appeal.”  Local App. R. 
3.3(a); see also Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2) (“An appellant’s failure to take any step other 
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal . . . is ground . . . for the court of appeals to act 
as it considers appropriate, including dismissing the appeal.”); Local App. R. Misc. 
107.1(a) (“The clerk is authorized to dismiss the appeal if the appellant does not pay the 
docketing fee within 14 days after the case is opened in the court of appeals.”).  It was 
therefore well within our power and authority to dismiss Barner’s first notice of appeal 
for failure to pay filing fees. 
Even still, Barner argues that his motion for reconsideration pending in the District 
Court operated to deprive us of power to act on the first notice of appeal.  Barner relies 
on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(B)(i).2
If a party files a notice of appeal after the court announces or enters a 
judgment—but before it disposes of any motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4)(A)—
the notice becomes effective to appeal a judgment or order, in whole or in 
part, when the order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered. 
  That rule provides:   
 
                                              
2 We will refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as “Rules,” and use the short-hand 
“Appellate Rule” when referring to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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Thus, according to Barner, we had no power to take any action on his appeal because 
jurisdiction over his case rested with the District Court, as it was still considering his 
motion for reconsideration. 
 We cannot accept Barner’s argument, as it would tie the hands of the clerk’s office 
in their processing of appeals.  Nothing in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(B)(i) prohibits the 
clerk’s office from dismissing an appeal if the proper procedures—here, the payment of 
filing fees—are not followed.  Rather, the common-sense reading of the rule is that it 
applies if the appeal is properly filed.  Here, Barner failed to pay the filing fee, and the 
clerk’s office properly dismissed his appeal.3
 Therefore, we were well within our authority to dismiss Barner’s first notice of 
appeal.   
  
   2. The Second Notice of Appeal  
 Barner filed a timely second notice of appeal from the District Court’s November 
13, 2007 order denying his untimely motion for reconsideration.  Barner contends that the 
second notice of appeal also brings up for review the underlying summary judgment 
orders because neither the District Court nor the defendants pointed out that his motion 
was untimely, and the District Court denied the motion on the merits.  We disagree. 
 As mentioned above, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) provides that “if a party timely 
files,” among other post-judgment motions, a motion for reconsideration, “the time to file 
an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing” of that motion.  Fed. 
                                              
3 Moreover, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) discusses what occurs if the litigant timely files a 
post-judgment motion.  Here, Barner’s motion for reconsideration was untimely, and, as 
discussed herein, there is no basis for treating it as timely.  See infra n.4. 
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R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).  The plain terms of this rule make clear that, in 
order for one’s time to file an appeal to be tolled, the litigant must “timely file[]” a post-
judgment motion.  See Lizardo, 619 F.3d at 278.   
 The provisions of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) apply, whether or not the opposing 
party or the district court recognizes that the motion was untimely.  In Lizardo, we held 
that “the forfeiture of a timeliness objection in the district court does not render an 
untimely motion timely for purposes of [Appellate] Rule 4(a)(4)(A) in this Court.”  619 
F.3d at 276.  In that case, Lizardo filed an untimely motion for reconsideration under 
Rule 59(e), asking the district court to reconsider the denial of his motion to vacate his 
criminal sentence.  The defendant, the government, did not raise the issue of timeliness 
before the district court.  The district court did not raise the issue of timeliness either, and 
denied the motion on the merits.  Lizardo filed a timely notice of appeal as to the order 
denying his motion of reconsideration; but that notice of appeal was untimely as to the 
underlying order denying his motion to vacate his sentence.  Id. at 275.  On appeal, 
Lizardo contended that the government “waived its right to object to the tolling of the 
notice of appeal deadline because it did not object to his untimely Rule 59(e) motion in 
the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”  Id. at 276.  As such, he contended that we also had jurisdiction 
over the underlying order denying his motion to vacate his sentence.  We rejected 
Lizardo’s argument, and instead held that a party’s failure to raise the issue of timeliness 
of a post-judgment motion in the district court does not foreclose him from raising the 
timeliness of that motion on appeal, and asserting that tolling under Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A) does not apply.  Id. at 276. 
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 Lizardo is directly controlling here.  Although neither the defendants nor the 
District Court recognized that Barner’s motion for reconsideration was untimely, on 
appeal the defendants point out that Barner’s motion in the District Court was, indeed, 
untimely.4
 B. The Motion for Reconsideration 
  As such, we hold that Barner’s untimely motion for reconsideration did not 
toll his time to file an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  Therefore, we do not have 
jurisdiction to consider the underlying summary judgment orders.  Rather, our 
jurisdiction extends only to the District Court’s order denying his motion for 
reconsideration. 
 We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  
Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010).  Generally, motions for 
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must rely on one of the following three grounds: “(1) an 
intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the 
need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”  Id.  Barner contends that 
                                              
4 In his brief on appeal, Barner suggests, for the first time, that his motion for 
reconsideration was untimely because prison officials may have delayed delivering the 
District Court’s summary judgment orders to him.  In some instances, actual delay or 
interference by prison officials in the delivery of court orders to prisoners may allow us 
to deem an otherwise untimely post-judgment motion timely for the purposes of tolling 
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  See United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 289-90 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (“[A] prison’s actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final order of the 
district court is excluded from the calculation of the timeliness of motions for 
reconsideration . . . filed by pro se inmates.”); Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, --- F.3d 
---, No. 06-4732, slip op. at 15 (3d Cir. Feb. 10, 2012) (affirming the holding of Fiorelli).  
However, Barner’s case is not such an instance, for he failed to make any explicit 
allegation of prison delay before the District Court.  In fact, Barner’s Rule 59(e) motion 
shows that he filed that motion late because he believed that he was entitled to an 
additional three days, in accordance with former Rule 6(e).  Thus, his suggestion of 
prison delay on appeal is insufficient to invoke the rule of Fiorelli and Long. 
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the District Court erred in denying the motion for reconsideration because it should have 
given him more time to file a response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  
The District Court, however, granted Barner numerous extensions of time to file a 
response.  Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Barner’s 
motion for reconsideration. 
III.  Conclusion 
 Accordingly, we will affirm. 
